Abstract. This paper reports impossible differential cryptanalysis on the 128-bit block cipher CLEFIA that was proposed in 2007, including new 9-round impossible differentials for CLEFIA, and the result of an impossible differential attack using them. For the case of a 128-bit key, it is possible to apply the impossible differential attack to CLEFIA reduced to 12 rounds. The number of chosen plaintexts required is 2
Introduction
Differential attacks [2] and linear attacks [3] are the most common methods of attack applied to block ciphers. Guaranteeing security against differential attacks and linear attacks is an important problem in the design of block ciphers. One known method of evaluating security against such attacks uses the minimum number of active S-boxes. Shirai et al. proposed in 2004 the diffusion switching mechanism (DSM), a method of designing a Feistel structure block cipher that can guarantee a large minimum number of active S-boxes [4, 5] . In 2007, CLEFIA, a 128-bit block cipher designed using DSM, was proposed [6] . The designers of CLEFIA adopted a four-branch generalized Feistel structure to achieve both a small implementation size and high speed. The generalized Feistel structure tends to require more rounds to guarantee security than does an ordinary Feistel structure, but CLEFIA can guarantee resistance to differential attacks and linear attacks with a small number of rounds because of the use of DSM.
The impossible differential attack [1] is a method that was first applied against Skipjack to reject wrong key candidates by using input difference and output difference pairs whose probabilities are zero (impossible differentials). Impossible differentials that are dependent on the basic structure of the data processing part are often used, and this method is a particular threat to the generalized Feistel structure. Since CLEFIA is a generalized Feistel structure, the impossible differential attack is an effective attack against CLEFIA. According to the designers, an evaluation of CLEFIA with respect to an impossible differential attack [6, 7] shows that there are 9-round impossible differentials in CLEFIA, and for a 128-bit key, a 10-round impossible differential attack is possible. For key lengths of 192 bits and 256 bits, 11-round and 12-round impossible differential attacks are possible.
In this paper, we show that there are previously unknown 9-round impossible differentials in CLEFIA and report the result of impossible differential attacks using those impossible differentials. These impossible differentials exist in structures that are designed using DSM. In the impossible differential attacks on CLEFIA described in this paper, 12-round CLEFIA can be broken for a 128-bit key. For key lengths of 192 bits and 256 bits, impossible differential attacks are respectively possible for 13-round and 14-round CLEFIA.
There have been no reports on the cryptanalysis of CLEFIA other than the evaluation by the designers. Accordingly, the strong attack method for CLEFIA up to now is the differential attack and linear attack described in the designers' evaluation, which shows the possibility of 12-round, 13-round, and 14-round attack for the respective key lengths of 128 bits, 192 bits, and 256 bits. Nevertheless, these results are values for guaranteeing security with respect to differential attacks or linear attacks; the numbers of rounds for establishing actual differential attacks or linear attacks are probably smaller. Accordingly, the impossible differential attacks described in this paper are the result for the most number of rounds as an actual attack method on CLEFIA.
In this paper, we describe the CLEFIA structure in Sect. 2, explain the newly discovered impossible differentials and present attack procedures against CLEFIA using those differentials in Sect. 3. Section 4 concludes this paper.
Description of CLEFIA

Notation
We use the following notation in this paper.
a (b) b is the bit length of a If the bit length of a is known, (b) is omitted.
The concatenation of a and b
Bit-wise exclusive OR of a and b
For an 8n-bit string
denotes the number of non-zero a i s.
B(P )
Branch number for function P B(P ) = min a =0 {w b (a) + w b (P (a))}
Structure
In this section, we explain only the data processing part of CLEFIA. CLEFIA is a block cipher that has a block length of 128 bits and key lengths of 128, 192, and 256 bits.
The data processing part is a four-branch generalized Feistel structure with two parallel F functions (F 0 , F 1 ) per round. The number of respective rounds r for 128-bit, 192-bit and 256-bit keys are 18, 22 and 26. The encryption function EN C r generates 128-bit ciphertext from 128-bit plaintext, 2r 32-bit round keys (RK 0(32) , . . . , RK 2r−1(32) ), and four 32-bit whitening keys (W K 0 , . . . , W K 3 ). The structure of the encryption function EN C r is shown in Fig. 1 . EN C r is defined as follows.
Step 2. For i=0 to r − 1 do the following:
Step 2.1.
The two F functions, F 0 and F 1 , have 32-bit data x and 32-bit key RK as input; they output the 32-bit data y. F 0 is defined as follows. 
0x01 0x02 0x04 0x06 0x02 0x01 0x06 0x04 0x04 0x06 0x01 0x02 0x06 0x04 0x02 0x01
0x01 0x08 0x02 0x0a 0x08 0x01 0x0a 0x02 0x02 0x0a 0x01 0x08 0x0a 0x02 0x08 0x01
The multiplications between these matrices and vectors are performed in GF (2 8 ) defined by the primitive polynomial z
Fig. 2. Functions F0 and F1
3 Impossible Differential Attacks on CLEFIA
In this section, we present the new 9-round impossible differentials in Sect. 3.1, and explain the procedure for using those impossible differentials to attack CLE-FIA in Sect. 3.2 and subsequent sections.
Nine-round impossible differentials of CLEFIA
The following two new 9-round impossible differentials are found in CLEFIA,
where α in and α out are the differences shown in Table 1 . The X (8) and Y (8) in α in and α out are arbitrary non-zero values. These impossible differentials are entirely different from the impossible differentials found by the designers. The first impossible differential is represented in Fig. 3 . 
Here, we prove that where
is an impossible differential. Other impossible differentials can be proven in the same way.
Proof. Assume that the input difference ∆x
{4,0} of the fifth-round F 0 function for when the input difference is [0 (32
The ∆x {4,0} can be expressed using the fourth-round matrix M 0 and secondround matrix M 1 as
where X is the output difference for when the S 1 input difference is X, and X is the output difference for when the S 0 input difference is X; both are non-zero values. Also, the ∆x {4,0} can be expressed using the 8th-round matrix M 0 and the 6th-round matrix M 1 as
where Y is the output difference for when the S 0 input difference is Y and Y is the output difference for when the S 1 input difference is Y ; both are non-zero values.
From (1), (2) and (3), we obtain
From the CLEFIA specifications, the branch number of the concatenation
, for the left side of (4),
Furthermore, for the right side of (4),
Equations (5) and (6) 
Key Recovery Attack on 11-round CLEFIA
In this section, we explain an impossible differential attack on 11-round CLEFIA using the 9-round impossible differentials presented in Sect. 3.1 as preparation for an impossible differential attack on 12-round CLEFIA which we show in Sect. 3.3. For simplicity of explanation in the next section, we regard the first-round output to be plaintext and present the attack procedure for the 11 rounds from the second round to the 12th round. Of the 9-round impossible differentials shown in Sect. Fig. 4 . It is possible to recover RK 22 , RK 23 , and the most significant byte of W K 2 ⊕ RK 21 , which we represent as RK 21,0(8) . Plaintext Choice Method. Prepare a data set that comprises 2 40 plaintexts in which the first three bytes of the first word, and the third and fourth words of the plaintext are fixed as shown in Fig. 5 . In other words, there are 2 40 plaintexts for which the first three bytes of the fourth word x {1,3} , the second word x {1,1} , and the third word x {1,2} are fixed, if taken as the first-round output. If, for each value of the first word x {1,0} of the first-round output, it is possible to choose 2 8 plaintexts for which the least significant bytes of the fourth word x {1,3} are different (i.e., structures), the attack described in Sect. 3.2 can be applied. 
The first term on the right side of (7) is a fixed value. To choose 2 8 plaintexts (structure) such that the least significant bytes of x {1,3} are all different for each value of x {1,0} , we guess RK 0,3 and choose the data for which
, but when choosing a single structure, we can fix the value of x {1,0} . As a result, 2 32 structures can be chosen for the first-round output.
Key Recovery. Because an attack in the same way as described in Sect. 3.2 is possible, this description follows the procedure of that section. 
Key Recovery Attacks on 13 and 14-round CLEFIA
We present a 13-round CLEFIA attack for the key length of 192 bits or more shown in Fig. 6 and a 14-round CLEFIA attack for the key length of 256 bits. 26 , and RK 27 . In the same way as done in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3, we first present the attack procedure for the 12 rounds from the second round to the 13th round. Then, we extend one round on the plaintext side. Finally, we explain the 14-round attack. (key table) Key Recovery on 13-round CLEFIA. We extend the method for attack the 12-round CLEFIA that is described above by one round on the plaintext side to break 13-round CLEFIA. The time complexity required for attack is as follows. 
Movement of Whitening keys
W K 0 , W K 2 ,
Conclusion
We have presented previously unknown 9-round impossible differentials in CLE-FIA, which are impossible differentials that exist in structures designed by using DSM. We used these impossible differentials to apply impossible differential attacks on CLEFIA. The result showed that an impossible differential attack that is more efficient than exhaustive search is possible for 128-bit key, 12-round CLEFIA. Furthermore, attack of 13-round CLEFIA and 14-round CLEFIA is possible for key lengths of 192 bits and 256 bits, respectively. The number of chosen plaintexts, the time complexity, and the amount of memory required for attack are listed in Table 2 . Even though the 9-round impossible differentials presented in this paper have the same number of rounds characteristic as the impossible differentials identified by the designers, our impossible differential attacks exceed the designers' evaluation by two more rounds that can be broken for each key length. That is true for the following reason. For the impossible differentials found by the designers, the length of the parts of the plaintext differences and ciphertext differences that are not zero is 32 bits, and the plaintext differences and ciphertext differences must be the same. For our impossible differentials, however, the length of those parts is 8 bits, and it is not necessary for the plaintext differences and the ciphertext differences to be the same, that is, they are truncated differences. If the number of bits for which the difference is non-zero is small, the number of round key bits related to the difference is also small. Because it is possible to obtain round keys that span many rounds, the number of rounds that can be broken can be increased. Also, because it is a truncated difference, the probability of obtaining ciphertext that can be used in attack is high, and we were able to increase the number of rounds that can be broken by reducing the number of chosen plaintexts that are required. Other reasons for the successful attack are the movement of the whitening key and the use of the differential table method that is often used in differential attacks. Because the number of CLEFIA rounds is 18 for a key length of 128 bits, 22 for a 192-bit key and 26 for a 256-bit key, the impossible differential attacks presented in this paper do not affect the security of CLEFIA. These attacks can, however, break more rounds of than other CLEFIA attack methods.
There is currently no method for guaranteeing resistance to an impossible differential attack and no method for designing a block cipher that is resistant to an impossible differential attack. Accordingly, much time should be allocated to evaluation of block cipher with respect to impossible differential attacks. Furthermore, methods for guaranteeing resistance to an impossible differential attack and methods for designing block ciphers that resist impossible differential attacks are important topics for future research.
